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UPDATING TWENTIETH CENTURY WATER 
PROJECTS TO MEET TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
NEEDS: LESSONS FROM THE TRI-STATE WATER 
WARS 
Lewis B. Jones, John L. Fortuna, Karen M. Johnston 
INTRODUCTION 
As populations grow and water supplies dwindle, communities 
throughout the United States are looking for ways to fill the gap 
between supply and demand. In many cases, the water resources exist 
but are tied up in storage projects operated by the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers, which operates 136 multipurpose projects 
storing 9.8 million acre-feet of water (1.24 trillion gallons).1 As a 
result of outdated authorizations, under-developed laws, and 
dysfunctional politics, however, this water has all too often proved 
incredibly difficult to access. 
The “Tri-State Water Wars” among Alabama, Florida, and Georgia 
are a case in point. Metropolitan Atlanta, with a population of over 
five million people, lies in the Piedmont Region of North Georgia, 
where groundwater is scarce and surface water is limited to small, 
headwater streams with highly variable flows.2 As a result, 
Metropolitan Atlanta depends heavily on storage reservoirs—and in 
particular on two large Corps projects known as Lake Lanier and 
Allatoona Lake, which together provide over ninety percent of its 
water supply.3 No practical alternatives to these reservoirs exist, and 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Benedykt Dziegielewski & Jack C. Kiefer, U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, Water Resources Outlook 
8 (2006), available at http://www.iwr.usace.army.mil/Portals/70/docs/iwrreports/2007-R-03.pdf. 
 2. Metro. N. Ga. Water Planning Dist., Water Supply and Water Conservation Management Plan 
1–13 (2009), available at http://documents.northgeorgiawater.org/Water_Supply_Water_Conservation_ 
Plan_May2009.pdf (explaining that Atlanta developed in the headwaters of six different river basins); 
id. at 2-5 (“Groundwater sources make up less than one percent of the total available water supply in the 
Metro Water District due to bedrock geology.”). 
 3. Id. at 2-1 (explaining that the Chattahoochee River system, which includes Lake Lanier, is the 
“most significant water supply source for the region,” alone accounting “for approximately 73 percent 
of the permitted available water supply in the Metro Water District”); id. at 2-2 tbl.2-1 (showing 
proportion of withdrawals made available by Lake Lanier and Allatoona Lake, respectively). 
1
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the entire Metropolitan Atlanta region has developed in reliance upon 
them.4 Yet Atlanta has had to fight for over twenty years to establish 
its right to continue its existing use of these waters, let alone to 
secure adequate supplies to accommodate future growth.5 Indeed, 
Atlanta’s right to utilize these Corps projects was not established 
until 2012, when the issue was firmly and finally decided by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in In re Tri-
State Water Rights Litigation, and the Supreme Court denied further 
review.6 
The Tri-State decision has implications for many other federal 
projects. Lake Lanier, which was the focal point of the Tri-State case, 
is like many other Corps projects in that it was authorized in the 
1940s to serve a mix of purposes that may no longer be relevant. As 
in the case of many other projects, the region served by Lake Lanier 
has changed dramatically since Congress authorized the project. 
When Lake Lanier was authorized, the population of the entire 
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River Basin was just 1.6 
million,7 rural electrification was still a priority throughout the 
South,8 transportation networks were under-developed, and 
                                                                                                                 
 4. Id. at ES-9 (explaining that “Lake Lanier and Allatoona Lake have played a key role in assuring 
an adequate water supply for the Metro Water District since their construction by the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers (Corps) in the 1950s” and that “[a]fter reviewing alternatives to the use of the federal 
reservoirs, the Water District has concluded that there are no alternatives to the Chattahoochee River 
and the Etowah River as major water supply sources for north Georgia.”). 
 5. See In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2009), 
rev’d and vacated sub nom. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 
2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012); see also Shaila Dewan, River Basin Fight Pits 
Atlanta Against Neighbors, N.Y. Times (Aug. 15, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/16/us/ 
16water.html; Judge Rules Against Atlanta Regional Water Wars, USA Today (July 17, 2009, 3:34 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-07-17-lake-lanier_N.htm; Water Wars in the 
South-east: Chattahoochee Blues, Economist (Sept. 16, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
17043462. 
 6. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160,1205 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012). 
 7. H.R. Doc. No. 80-300, at 17 (1947) (survey report discussing the plan of improvement for the 
ACF River Basin and the development of Lake Lanier, which is incorporated into the River and Harbor 
Act of 1946). 
 8. Significant legislation was enacted in furtherance of this goal, such as the Rural Electrification 
Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. §§ 901–918(c) (2006), and the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 831–831ee (2006). Rural electrification also played a prominent role in the authorization 
hearings concerning Lake Lanier. See, e.g., Rivers and Harbors Bill: Hearings Before the Comm. on 
Rivers and Harbors H.R. Seventy-Ninth Cong. Second Sess. on H.R. 6407 a Bill Authorizing the 
2
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environmental protection was hardly a consideration.9 Today, five 
million people reside in metropolitan Atlanta alone,10 water is scarce, 
the region is fully electrified and connected by highway and rail, and 
a host of environmental issues have risen to the fore. In short, 
priorities have changed. 
Unfortunately, the prevailing wisdom—in this controversy and 
others—has been that an Act of Congress may be required to modify 
existing projects to serve modern needs.11 The authors argue, 
however, that the need for Congressional action has been greatly 
overstated: The Tri-State decision makes clear that older 
authorizations, when properly understood and interpreted in their 
historical context, may provide significantly more authority to 
modify existing projects than has been previously believed. 
This paper will proceed in five basic parts. Part I provides a brief 
discussion of the legal framework governing the authorization and 
modification of Corps projects.12 Part II provides a brief overview of 
                                                                                                                 
Construction, Repair and Preservation of Certain Public Works on Rivers and Harbors, and for Other 
Purposes, 79th Cong. 249, 251 (1946) (statement of Rep. John E. Rankin, Member H. Comm. on Rivers 
and Harbors) (noting that there are 250,000 farms in Georgia and that electrification would “double the 
value of every farm it touches”). 
 9. The Gulf sturgeon is a case in point. No one considered the fact that construction of the large 
dams authorized by Congress would block its migration to historic spawning grounds in the 
Chattahoochee River. And at the same time, the City of Apalachicola, Florida was the center of a 
significant Gulf sturgeon fishery that severely depleted the species. The sturgeon is slowly coming back, 
since the fishery was closed in the 1990s, but it is still listed as a threatened species and managed under 
the Endangered Species Act. See The Gulf Sturgeon Recovery/Mgmt. Task Team, Gulf Sturgeon 
Recovery/Management Plan 22–24 (1995), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/recovery/ 
sturgeon_gulf.pdf. 
 10. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, at 26–28 tbl.20 (2012), 
available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0020.pdf. 
 11. See, e.g., C. Grady Moore, Water Wars: Interstate Water Allocation in the Southeast, 14 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T. 5, 9 (1999) (discussing Alabama’s position in interstate compact negotiations 
with Georgia that projects must be strictly operated to provide the levels of navigation support 
envisioned in the authorizing reports, even though major projects needed to support these flows were 
never constructed and notwithstanding the fact that these operations are outdated and inefficient); 
George William Sherk, The Management of Interstate Water Conflicts in the Twenty-First Century: Is It 
Time to Call Uncle?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 764, 771 n.21, 781 (2005) (opining that flood control and 
hydropower are the only two authorized purposes of the project and that “Lake Lanier was not 
authorized by Congress to be a water supply reservoir,” and broadly suggesting that congressional 
action is needed). This is, of course, also the position of Alabama, Florida, and the other parties 
challenging the Corps’ water supply authority at Lake Lanier, as well as the position adopted by the 
district court. 
 12. See infra Part I. 
3
Jones et al.: Updating Twentieth Century Water Projects to Meet Twenty-First Ce
Published by Reading Room, 2013
962 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:4 
the Tri-State litigation and the dispute surrounding the Corps’ 
authority to operate Lake Lanier to accommodate Atlanta’s growing 
water supply needs.13 Parts III and IV discuss the basic flaw in the 
Corps’ interpretation of the authorizing legislation for Lake Lanier, 
with a focus on the intervening policy developments and 
authorization and funding procedures that caused the Corps and the 
district court to underestimate the Corps’ authority to modify project 
operations to meet Atlanta’s needs.14 Finally, Part V discusses what 
role, if any, post-authorization legislative history and appropriations 
legislation should play in interpreting authorizing legislation.15 
I. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING AUTHORIZATION AND 
MODIFICATION OF CORPS PROJECTS 
The Corps enjoys broad discretion to operate water projects under 
its control. The general understanding is that Congress identifies the 
purposes to be served by a project while leaving it to the Corps to 
determine how to balance competing objectives.16 Because there is 
very little statutory law on point, however, and because individual 
project authorizations vary widely, it is not always easy to identify 
the authorized purposes for any given project. The Corps’ own 
analysis of the “authorized purposes” for each of its projects is set 
forth in a table published the Code of Federal Regulations at 33 
C.F.R. § 222.5, Appendix E.17 
                                                                                                                 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See infra Part III and Part IV. 
 15. See infra Part V. 
 16. In South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, for example, the Eighth Circuit rejected an argument by the 
Corps that a challenge to the operation of its Missouri River projects should be dismissed because there 
was no law to apply. See 330 F.3d 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003). The court explained that the Corps’ 
discretion is not entirely unconstrained because the authorizing legislation “lays out purposes that the 
Corps is to consider in managing the River.” Id. The Court thus held that it could review the Corps’ 
operating decisions “to ensure that it considered each of these interests before making a decision.” Id. 
The court also acknowledged, however, that its function was very limited because the applicable law 
“does not provide . . . a method of deciding whether the balance actually struck by the Corps in a given 
case is correct or not.” Id. 
 17. See also U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Authorized and Operating Purposes of Corps of Engineers 
Reservoirs 2 (1992, rev. 1994), available at http://corpslakes.usace.army.mil/employees/pdfs/94r-
opreservoir.pdf. This report was prepared and submitted to Congress to comply with Section 311 of the 
Water Resources Development Act of 1990, which directed the Secretary to identify the authorized and 
4
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Project authorities can be divided into two basic groups—specific 
authorities and general authorities. Specific authorities are contained 
in the initial authorization for a project and in any subsequent 
legislation that modifies the original authorizing legislation.18 
Specific authorities often include purposes such as navigation, flood 
control, hydropower, water supply, and recreation.19 
Congress has authorized other purposes through general legislation 
applicable to all Corps projects or to all projects constructed after a 
given date.20 Examples of these general authorities include authority 
provided by the Flood Control Act of 1944 to sell “surplus water” 
and to construct and operate recreational facilities;21 authority 
provided by the Water Supply Act of 1958 to include storage for 
municipal and industrial water supply;22 authority provided by the 
Clean Water Act to augment low flows to benefit water quality;23 
authority provided by the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act to 
modify projects to conserve fish and wildlife;24 and authority 
provided by the Endangered Species Act to address the needs of 
endangered and threatened species.25 The limitations applicable to 
these authorities vary by statute. 
In addition, the Army has some inherent authority to make minor 
modifications to the plans approved by Congress. In some cases the 
authority to modify a plan is explicitly provided in the authorizing 
                                                                                                                 
operating purposes for each of its projects. Water Resources Development Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-640, 104 Stat. 4604 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). 
 18. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, supra note 17, at 1, 2. 
 19. Id. at 1–3. 
 20. Id. at 2. 
 21. Flood Control Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, 58 Stat. 887 (1944) (codified in scattered 
sections of 16, 33 & 43 U.S.C.). For recreation, see also the Federal Water Project Recreation Act of 
1965, 16 U.S.C. § 460l-12 to -21 (2006). That act declared it Congress’s intent that recreation and fish 
and wildlife enhancement be given full consideration as project purposes provided non-Federal bodies 
agree to certain cost-sharing requirements. Id. 
 22. Water Supply Act of 1958, 43 U.S.C. § 390b (2006). 
 23. 33 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (mandating that consideration be given at all projects “to inclusion of 
storage for regulation of streamflow, except that any such storage and water releases shall not be 
provided as a substitute for adequate treatment or other methods of controlling waste at the source”). 
 24. 16 U.S.C. § 662(c). 
 25. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (authorizing all federal agencies to “utilize their authorities in furtherance of 
the purposes of [the Act] by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered species and 
threatened species”). 
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legislation,26 but this is the exception and not the rule.27 Even when 
the authorizing legislation is silent, it is generally accepted that the 
Army has discretion to modify the specific plans authorized by 
Congress without further legislation so long as the modification is not 
“so foreign to the original purpose as to be arbitrary or capricious.”28 
This general understanding is reflected in an internal guidance 
document (called an “Engineering Regulation”) addressing the 
Army’s authority to modify completed projects.29 The Engineering 
Regulation states that “significant modifications” require 
Congressional authorization.30 It indicates that modifications should 
be deemed “significant” if they would “serve new purposes” or 
“extend services to new beneficiaries (areas).”31 It provides little 
guidance, however, to assist in determining whether a given purpose 
should be considered “new,” as this is a question of statutory 
interpretation that can only be determined by examining the specific 
history of each project. 
                                                                                                                 
 26. For example, the Water Resources Development Act of 1986 authorized numerous projects 
“with such modifications as are recommended by the Chief of Engineers and approved by the Secretary, 
and with such other modifications as are recommended by the Secretary.” Water Resources 
Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100 Stat. 4082 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 
16, 26, 33 & 42). 
 27. It is much more common for the Chief of Engineers to request such authority in the report 
submitted to Congress. For example, the report recommending authorization of the Benbrook Dam in 
Tarrant County, Texas includes a recommendation that the project be approved “with such future 
modifications thereof as in the discretion of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Engineers may be 
advisable.” United States v. 2,606.84 Acres of Land, 432 F.2d 1286, 1292 (5th Cir. 1970) (quoting H.R. 
Doc. No. 77-403, at 7). When Congress then authorized the project to be constructed in accordance with 
the Chief of Engineers’ report, the Fifth Circuit held that Congress had, in effect, granted the Chief of 
Engineers’ request, thus providing substantial authority for the Army to deviate from the specific plans 
authorized by Congress. Id. 
 28. See Creppel v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 670 F.2d 564, 572 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Britt v. 
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 769 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 1985); United States ex rel. Chapman v. Fed. 
Power Comm’n, 191 F.2d 796, 806 (4th Cir. 1951), aff’d, 345 U.S. 153 (1953); Ryan v. Chi., B. & Q. R. 
Co., 59 F.2d 137, 142 (7th Cir. 1932). 
 29. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Engineering Regulation No. 1165-2-119 ¶ 1 (1982), available at 
http://publications.usace.army.mil/publications/eng-regs/ER_1165-2-119/ER_1165-2-119.pdf. Although 
called a “regulation,” this document is more properly considered “guidance” because it was not 
promulgated in accordance with the procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act. 
 30. Id. ¶ 5. 
 31. Id. 
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TRI-STATE WATER RIGHTS LITIGATION32 
Georgia, Alabama, and Florida have been litigating over the 
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River Basin and the 
Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) River Basin for almost a quarter 
century.33 The main point in controversy is the scope of the Corps’ 
authority to use two federal reservoirs—Lake Lanier and Allatoona 
Lake—to provide drinking water to communities in Metropolitan 
Atlanta.34 As framed in the litigation, two basic questions were 
presented: first, whether water supply is a specifically “authorized 
purpose” of these projects; and second, whether the Corps’ water 
supply operations exceed its supplemental authority under the Water 
Supply Act of 1958.35 
The litigation commenced in 1990 when the Corps released a draft 
plan to reallocate storage in both Lake Lanier (in the ACF) and 
Allatoona Lake (in the ACT), and to execute contracts with water 
supply providers in North Georgia that would assure their access to 
water stored in the projects into the future.36 Alabama filed suit in the 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Here, we provide only a brief history and sufficient facts to place the dispute over Lake Lanier’s 
so-called “authorized purposes” in context. For a more complete history of this controversy, see, for 
example, Robert Haskell Abrams, Settlement of the ACF Controversy: Sisyphus at the Dawn of the 21st 
Century, 31 HAMLINE L. REV. 679 (2008). 
 33. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1165 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1165–66. 
 36. See id. at 1173 (citing Army Corps of Eng’rs, Post-Authorization Change Notification Report 
(1989)). The Army Corps’ draft plan was thought to be the final step in a long-term partnership with the 
Corps to meet Atlanta’s water needs. After nearly a decade of joint study by federal, state, and local 
agencies, including the Corps and the city of Atlanta, Congress authorized the construction of a 
“reregulating dam for water supply purposes” on the Chattahoochee River below Lake Lanier. See 
Water Resources Development Act of 1986, § 601(a), Pub. L. No. 99–662, 100 Stat. 4082 (codified in 
scattered sections of 16, 26, 33 & 42 U.S.C.). This reregulation dam was intended to capture peaking 
hydropower releases from Lake Lanier and attenuate the flow to make water available for withdrawal by 
Atlanta downstream. Indeed, the explicit purpose of the plan authorized by Congress was to increase 
water supply for Metropolitan Atlanta. South Atlantic Division, Army Corps of Engineers, Comments 
on Draft Post Authorization Change Report for Lake Lanier Reallocation at ¶ 1 (Dec. 5, 1989) (on file 
with author). 
Following an environmental study required by the National Environmental Policy Act, the Corps 
concluded that it would be preferable to reallocate storage in Lake Lanier to water supply permanently 
rather than to build the reregulation dam authorized by Congress. To that end, the Corps prepared the 
Draft Post Authorization Change Report, which proposed to reallocate 207,000 acre-feet of storage in 
Lake Lanier to water supply. Id. 
7
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Northern District of Alabama to enjoin the Corps from finalizing or 
implementing the draft plan.37 This litigation was stayed several 
months later to give the states and the Corps time to negotiate. The 
stay remained in effect and led to the formation of two interstate 
compacts—one for each basin—in 1997.38 
The two compacts established a governing structure but did not 
include a formula for allocating water among the states.39 In essence, 
they were “agreement[s] to agree” on an allocation formula, which 
the signatories anticipated would be negotiated within one year.40 
This did not occur, however, and (after several extensions) the ACF 
and ACT Compacts terminated in 2003 and 2004, respectively.41 
While the compact allocation negotiations were still pending, the 
State of Georgia submitted a “water supply request” to the Corps.42 
In this request, Georgia asked the Corps to reallocate storage in Lake 
Lanier in an amount sufficient to accommodate withdrawals (either 
directly from Lake Lanier or from the Chattahoochee River below the 
project) in the amount of 705 million gallons per day.43 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1122–23 (11th Cir. 2005). Several 
aspects of Alabama’s original suit are notable. First, it was commenced before the draft Post 
Authorization Change Report was finalized and before the proposed contracts were executed. See id. 
The suit was thus clearly unripe at the time it was filed. Second, the suit alleged only violations of the 
National Environmental Policy Act. Id. at 1123. The notion that the draft plan exceeded the Corps’ 
authority did not creep into the litigation until much later. 
 38. See Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104, 111 Stat. 
2219 (1997) (ACF Compact); Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-105, 
111 Stat. 2233 (1997) (ACT Compact). 
 39. See ACF Compact art. VII(a) (stating that it was “the intent of the parties to this Compact to 
develop an allocation formula for equitably apportioning the surface waters of the ACF Basin among the 
states,” that “[w]hen an allocation formula [was] unanimously approved by the State Commissioners, 
there shall be an agreement among the states regarding an allocation formula,” and that “[t]he allocation 
formula thus agreed upon shall become effective and binding upon the parties to this Compact” upon 
concurrence by the Federal Commissioner); ACT Compact art. VII(a) (same). 
 40. See, e.g., Benjamin L. Snowden, Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty: Understanding the 
Failure of the ACF and ACT Compacts, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 134, 146 (2005) (explaining that “the 
drafters of the ACF and ACT compacts . . . ’punted’ on the most important issue: the actual allocation of 
the waters”); Andrew Thornley, A Tale of Two River Basins: The Southeast Finds Itself in a Rare 
Interstate Water Struggle, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 97, 102 (2005) (pointing out that the “compacts 
contained no allocation formula, which is noteworthy ‘since most water compacts allocate water’”). 
 41. Joseph F. Zimmerman, Interstate Disputes: The Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction 170–71 
(2006). 
 42. See Letter from Roy E. Barnes, Governor of Ga., to Honorable Joseph W. Westphal, Asst. Sec’y 
of the Army for Civil Works (May 16, 2000) (on file with author). 
 43. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 
8
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The Corps denied Georgia’s water supply request on grounds that 
it could not “be accommodated without additional Congressional 
authorization.”44 The legal memorandum accompanying the denial 
explained that water supply was not an “authorized purpose” of Lake 
Lanier under the River and Harbor Act of 1946, which was the 
original legislation authorizing construction of the project.45 The 
Corps recognized that the River and Harbor Act of 1946 did not itself 
say anything about the authorized purposes of Lake Lanier; instead, 
the Act merely directed that the project be constructed “in accordance 
with” certain engineering reports and project documents prepared by 
the Corps, which were incorporated into statute.46 The Corps found, 
however, that those engineering reports and project documents 
identified only three congressionally authorized purposes: 
hydropower, flood control, and navigation.47 Water supply, according 
to the Corps, was intended as merely an “incidental benefit” of 
releases for the other authorized purposes.48 
Having concluded that water supply was not an authorized 
purpose, the Corps then analyzed whether it could grant Georgia’s 
request under the supplemental authority provided by the Water 
                                                                                                                 
curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012) (explaining that “the State of Georgia submitted a formal 
request to the Corps to modify its operation of the Buford Project in order to meet the Georgia Parties’ 
water supply needs through 2030. The request was to withdraw 408 mgd from the river and 297 mgd 
directly from the lake”); Letter from Roy E. Barnes, supra note 42 at 1. 
 44. See Letter from R. L. Brownlee, Acting Assistant Sec’y of the Army for Civil Works, to Roy E. 
Barnes, Governor of Ga. (Apr. 15, 2002) (on file with author). 
 45. See Memorandum from Earl Stockdale, Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs 
(Civil Works & Env’t), to Acting Assistant Sec’y of the Army 2, 3–8 (Apr. 15, 2002) [hereinafter 
Stockdale Memorandum] (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review). 
 46. Id. at 4. As it relates to Lake Lanier, the sole reference to the ACF River Basin in the Act is 
found in the list of sixty “works of improvement,” as follows: 
Apalachicola, Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers, Georgia and Florida; in accordance with 
the report of the Chief of Engineers, dated May 13, 1946: Provided, That the proposed 
dam referred to in such report as Junction Dam shall, upon its completion, be known and 
designated on the public records as the Jim Woodruff Dam[.] 
River and Harbor Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-525 § 1, 60 Stat. 634. 
 47. Stockdale Memorandum, supra note 45, at 4. 
 48. Id. at 4 (reasoning that the project documents indicate “that navigation, hydropower and flood 
control were the specifically authorized purposes—those purposes which render the project 
economically feasible and which govern the operation of the reservoir. On the other hand, water supply 
was clearly one of the project’s incidental benefits—those benefits that accrue to the project as a 
byproduct of its operation for its specifically authorized purposes”). 
9
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Supply Act of 1958.49 The Corps concluded that it could not because 
the request would result in a “major operational change” and 
“seriously affect” the other authorized purposes of the project.50 
Georgia and the Georgia Water Supply Providers filed suit in the 
Northern District of Georgia to challenge the Corps’ denial of 
Georgia’s water supply request.51 They were hardly the only parties 
to file suit to challenge the Corps’ actions in the ACF River Basin, 
however, and litigation proliferated following the collapse of the 
Compacts. At one time there were no fewer than eight different 
district court cases pending in federal courts in Georgia, Florida, 
Alabama, and the District of Columbia.52 The various cases were 
ultimately consolidated in a multidistrict litigation proceeding in 
2007, transferring claims involving the ACF River Basin to the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Florida while claims 
involving the ACT River Basin remaining in the U.S. District Court 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 7–12. 
 50. Id.; see also 43 U.S.C. § 390b(d) (2006). As relevant here, the Water Supply Act of 1958 
imposes two limits the Corps’ discretion to modify projects to include water supply without seeking 
additional congressional authorization: 
Modifications of a reservoir project heretofore authorized, surveyed, planned, or 
constructed to include storage as provided in subsection (b) of this section which would 
seriously affect the purposes for which the project was authorized, surveyed, planned, or 
constructed, or which would involve major structural or operational changes shall be 
made only upon the approval of Congress as now provided by law. 
Id. 
 51. Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 223 F.R.D. 691, 693 (N.D. Ga. 2004), aff’d, 144 F. 
App’x 850 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 52. These included the original suit by Alabama that precipitated the tri-state legal battle (which was 
bifurcated by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation into separate proceedings in federal courts in 
Florida and Alabama), the suit by Georgia and the Georgia Water Supply Providers challenging the 
Corps’ denial of Georgia’s water supply request, a suit by hydropower customers who purchase power 
from the Corps alleging that water supply withdrawals impacted hydropower production, suits by the 
State of Florida and the City of Apalachicola, Florida challenging the Corps’ compliance with the 
Endangered Species Act and other statutes, a suit by the City of Columbus, Georgia seeking to ensure 
flows in the Chattahoochee River sufficient for wastewater dilution, and a second suit by Georgia and 
the Water Supply Providers challenging an interim operating rule adopted by the Corps to address 
Florida’s Endangered Species Act claims. See In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 
1160, 1165 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25, (2012) (“The four underlying 
cases are Alabama v. United States Army Corps of Engineers; Southeastern Federal Power Customers, 
Inc. v. Caldera; Georgia v. United States Army Corps of Engineers; and City of Apalachicola v. United 
States Army Corps of Engineers.”); Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1121 (11th 
Cir. 2005) (noting there were “are two ancillary proceedings which are relevant to these appeals,” 
Southeastern Federal Power Customers, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 00–CV–2975 
(D.D.C.) and Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2:01–CV–00026–RWS (N.D. Ga.)). 
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for the Northern District of Alabama.53 The ACF litigation was 
further bifurcated to separate claims involving the Corps’ authority to 
operate Lake Lanier to meet Atlanta’s water supply needs from other 
claims involving the Endangered Species Act, the National 
Environmental Policy Act, and other statutes.54 
Against this backdrop, the scope of the Corps’ authority to operate 
Lake Lanier to meet Atlanta’s water supply needs was presented to 
the district court in two separate but related ways. On the one hand, 
Alabama, Florida, and others presented the district court with claims 
that Atlanta’s existing water use exceeded the Corps’ legal 
authority.55 On the other hand, the district court reviewed claims by 
Georgia and the Georgia Water Supply Providers that the Corps erred 
in concluding it lacked the authority to grant Georgia’s water supply 
request, which was intended to facilitate expanded withdrawals 
necessary to meet future water supply needs.56 
In 2009, the district court issued a summary judgment order and 
injunction in favor of Alabama, Florida and the other plaintiffs 
challenging the Corps’ authority to meet Atlanta’s water supply 
needs.57 The district court decision included three basic parts. First, 
the district court affirmed the Corps’ denial of Georgia’s water 
supply request, including the determination that water supply is not 
an authorized purpose of Lake Lanier.58 It did so based on many of 
the same factors identified by the Corps in the Stockdale 
Memorandum, as well as evidence and “legislative history” that post-
dated the authorization of the project in 1946.59 Second, the district 
court found that Georgia’s water supply request would exceed the 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d at 1176–77; In re Tri-State Water 
Rights Litig., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1353 (J.P.M.L. 2007). 
 54. See Third Amended Joint Scheduling Order, No. 3:07-md-00001 (Nov. 7, 2008) (discussing 
bifurcation of proceeding). 
 55. In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1347 (M.D. Fla. 2009), rev’d and 
vacated sub nom. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012). 
 56. Id. at 1352–54 (addressing Georgia’s claim). 
 57. Id. at 1356. 
 58. See id. at 1347 (coming to what it termed “the inescapable conclusion that water supply, at least 
in the form of withdrawals from Lake Lanier, is not an authorized purpose of the Buford project”). 
 59. Id. 
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Corps’ authority under the Water Supply Act of 1958 because it 
would result in a “major operational change” and would “seriously 
affect” the authorized purposes of the project.60 Third, the district 
court held that, for the same reasons, even Atlanta’s existing water 
supply uses exceeded the Corps’ authority.61 Based on these three 
conclusions, the district court entered an injunction, which the court 
itself called “draconian,” giving Metropolitan Atlanta just three years 
to find an alternative water supply, after which time the taps and 
toilets of some 3.5 million to 4 million people would run dry.62 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed and vacated the district court’s ruling in June 2011.63 The 
Eleventh Circuit found that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the various claims by Alabama, Florida and others 
challenging Atlanta’s existing water supply withdrawals, finding that 
the suits failed to identify any final agency action subject to review 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).64 Insofar as 
Alabama, Florida and others challenged the Corps’ operations to 
meet Atlanta’s current water supply needs, the court explained that 
the Corps had not reached any final decision concerning its water 
supply operations at Lake Lanier.65 The court also concluded that—
despite the fact that the dispute over Lake Lanier’s operation had 
been ongoing for more than two decades—the Corps’ failure to take 
final agency action was reasonable under the circumstances, 
explaining that the Corps had been prevented from taking final action 
through a combination of court injunctions, voluntary stays to 
facilitate negotiations among the states, and the ACF Compact.66 The 
court accordingly vacated the district court’s self-described 
“draconian” injunction, allowing metropolitan Atlanta’s water supply 
                                                                                                                 
 60. See id. at 1347–54. 
 61. See In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d at 1352–54. 
 62. See id. at 1355. 
 63. See In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1205 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012). 
 64. See id. at 1181–85. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id. at 1182–84. 
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withdrawals to continue until the Corps reaches a final decision on its 
water supply operations. 
The court did, however, have jurisdiction to review the Corps’ 
denial of Georgia’s water supply request, which was undoubtedly 
final agency action under the APA. And on this point, the Eleventh 
Circuit also reversed.67 Contrary to the opinion of both the Corps and 
the district court, the Eleventh Circuit held that water supply is, and 
always has been, a fully authorized purpose of Lake Lanier.68 The 
Court explained that the project documents incorporated into the 
River and Harbor Act of 1946 “clearly indicate[] that Congress 
intended for water supply to be an authorized, rather than incidental, 
use of the water stored in Lake Lanier,”69 and that the “language of 
the [River and Harbor Act of 1946] clearly indicates that water 
supply was an authorized purpose of the Buford Project” and Lake 
Lanier.70 The Court explained that Congress intended for project 
operations to change to meet Atlanta’s growing water supply needs 
when it authorized the project in 1946, and that Congress understood 
that any marginal impact to hydropower production would be more 
than outweighed by providing Atlanta an assured water supply 
source.71 The Eleventh Circuit accordingly remanded the case to the 
Corps to reconsider Georgia’s water supply request in light of this 
clarified legal authority.72 
Following the Eleventh Circuit’s remand, the Corps issued a legal 
opinion in June 2012 concluding that it has sufficient authority to 
grant Georgia’s water supply request but that it must prepare an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) before deciding whether or not 
to do so.73 The Corps is now in the process of preparing the EIS.74 
                                                                                                                 
 67. See id. at 1192–97. 
 68. See id. at 1187–92. 
 69. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d at 1188–89. 
 70. Id. at 1192. 
 71. Id. at 1188. 
 72. Id. at 1200–01. 
 73. Memorandum from Earl H. Stockdale, Chief Counsel, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, to the Chief 
of Engineers (June 25, 2012), available at www.sam.usace.army.mil/Portals/46/docs/planning_ 
environmental/acf/docs/2012ACF_legalopinion.pdf. 
 74. See Notice of Intent To Revise Scope of Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Updating the 
Water Control Manual for the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin, 77 Fed. Reg. 62224-01–
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A. An Anachronistic Analysis: Viewing Project Authorizations 
Through The Lens Of Modern Policy 
Given that the Eleventh Circuit, the district court, and the Corps all 
reached such starkly different conclusions, it is fair to ask how and 
why their analyses diverged. The answer, we suggest, is two-fold. 
First, the district court focused largely on documents and 
congressional testimony developed long after the legislation 
authorizing Lake Lanier was enacted, giving only scant attention to 
the actual authorizing legislation that the Eleventh Circuit found 
controlling.75 Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, the Corps 
(and to a certain degree the district court) viewed the authorizing 
legislation and incorporated reports through a distorted lens, reading 
the authorizing documents as if they had been written today, in 
accordance with modern principles and guidelines that did not exist 
at the time. As explained more fully below, the modern guidelines 
make it easy to identify a discrete set of “authorized purposes” for 
each project. These modern guidelines were not developed until later, 
however, and the result of viewing project documents from the 1940s 
through this anachronistic lens is to distort them. The Eleventh 
Circuit, in contrast, was able to read the historical documents on their 
own terms. When this is done, the documents reveal quite clearly—in 
terms appropriate to the era—that water supply was among the 
primary purposes of Lake Lanier. 
When the Corps denied Georgia’s Water Supply Request in 2000, 
it did so based on its interpretation of the Chief of Engineers’ report 
referenced in the River and Harbor Act of 1946, which it erroneously 
viewed as establishing that water supply was not an “authorized 
purpose” of Lake Lanier.76 As the outcome of this litigation 
demonstrates, the legal determination as to whether a purpose is or is 
not an “authorized purpose” is extremely important, as it marks the 
difference between a request the Corps cannot grant without 
                                                                                                                 
02 (Oct. 12, 2012). 
 75. For a discussion on this analytical error, see infra Part V. 
 76. See supra note 45–46 and accompanying text (discussing the Corps’ rationale, as set forth in the 
Stockdale Memorandum). 
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additional Congressional authorization and one the Corps has almost 
unlimited discretion to accommodate. The litigation also shows, 
however, that the legal framework for this analysis is not at all clear. 
The first difficulty lies in the fact that the legislation authorizing a 
project rarely enumerates “authorized purposes” as such. Instead, the 
legislation typically authorizes a project to be constructed in 
accordance with a report submitted by the Chief of Engineers without 
further discussion.77 For example, Buford Dam and Lake Lanier were 
authorized by the River and Harbor Act of 1946,78 but as noted 
above, that legislation merely “adopted and authorized” a long list of 
sixty projects, including Buford Dam, to be “prosecuted under the 
direction of the Secretary of War and supervision of the Chief of 
Engineers, in accordance with the plans and subject to the conditions 
recommended by the Chief of Engineers in the respective reports 
hereinafter designated . . . .”79 
Ordinary tools of statutory interpretation are not much help with 
statutes like these. The traditional canons can be applied to the 
reports referenced in the statute, which are generally treated as if they 
were incorporated into the text of the legislation itself,80 but this can 
be problematic for several reasons. First, because the Chief of 
Engineers’ reports are written with a view to the initial proposed 
construction, they rarely have much, if anything, to say about 
potential future modifications. Second, the reports are not written by 
lawyers and are not generally intended to serve as legal documents. 
Instead, they tend to provide a broad, narrative description of the 
many potential benefits that a proposed project might bring and often 
include conflicting views about the benefits of one plan or another. It 
can be difficult, therefore, to parse them in the way one would parse 
                                                                                                                 
 77. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, supra note 17, at 2 (explaining that the authorized purposes of 
Corps projects “are not identified directly in the authorizing law but instead are contained in reports of 
the Secretary of the Army, Chief of Engineers, Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors, or others 
referred to in the law”). 
 78. Pub. L. No. 79-525, 60 Stat. 634 (1946). 
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., Anderson v. Seeman, 252 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir. 1958) (determining the 
congressionally authorized purposes of a project under the 1945 River and Harbor Act according to the 
Corps reports incorporated by reference into that statute); see also U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, supra 
note 17 at 2. 
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a statute or a contract to determine what was actually recommended 
for authorization. Third, because the reports also tend to be long and 
detailed, it can be difficult to identify those features of the project 
that Congress would have deemed material to, and thus a condition 
of, the authorization. Fourth, the project documents authored by the 
Corps are a product of their time; they are written in accordance with 
the Corps’ policies and procedures that have evolved over time, and 
yet the Corps seems to have lost sight of these changes—and thus 
persists in reading survey reports from the previous era as if they had 
been written today. 
While each of these problems played a role in the litigation over 
Lake Lanier, the fourth lies at the very heart of the Tri-State case. In 
the case of Lake Lanier, the Corps made a critical mistake by 
assuming that the Chief of Engineers’ report was written in 
accordance with modern policies and guidelines that make it easy to 
identify authorized purposes. According to the Corps, the authorized 
purposes of a project should be ascertained by looking only to “those 
purposes which render the project economically feasible and which 
govern the operation of the reservoir.”81 In this regard, the Corps 
placed special emphasis on three aspects of the Chief of Engineers’ 
report: (1) the fact that water supply was not explicitly identified as 
an “authorized purpose” in the Chief of Engineers’ report; (2) the fact 
that the benefit–cost analysis did not attribute any benefits to water 
supply; and (3) the fact that no storage was explicitly allocated to 
water supply.82 Modern guidelines require this type of breakdown 
whenever water supply (or any other purpose) is proposed to be 
included as a project purpose.83 Its omission in the Chief of 
Engineers’ Report for Lake Lanier led the Corps to conclude that 
water supply was not an authorized purpose of that project.84 
The Corps’ error lay in the fact that it viewed Lake Lanier’s 
authorization through the lens of its modern policies and guidelines 
that were not adopted until after 1946, when Lake Lanier was 
                                                                                                                 
 81. Stockdale Memorandum, supra note 45, at 4. 
 82. See id. at 7. 
 83. See, e.g., id., at 2. 
 84. Id. at 12. 
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authorized.85 The phrase “authorized purpose” was not a term of art 
in the 1940s, and it had no particular legal significance.86 Moreover, 
a specific breakdown of the costs and benefits attributable to each 
authorized purpose was simply not required at the time of Lake 
Lanier’s authorization.87 And finally, there was no requirement that 
the Corps specifically allocate storage to each of the authorized 
purposes.88 In short, all of the reasons the Corps offered to conclude 
water supply was not an authorized purpose of Lake Lanier were 
based on policies that did not exist at the time the project was 
authorized. 
III. THE HISTORY THE CORPS FORGOT: POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
GOVERNING THE AUTHORIZATION OF WATER PROJECTS 
The fundamental flaw in the Corps’ approach to Lake Lanier was 
to assume that uniform policies of the type that exist today also 
existed when that project was authorized. If such uniform policies 
existed at the time when Lake Lanier was authorized, they might 
provide evidence of background understandings shared by Congress, 
but they did not. To the contrary, the struggle to develop a coherent 
national water policy had barely begun.89 Indeed, the Corps was not 
authorized to undertake multipurpose water projects until 1936,90 and 
it took decades even to agree on the federal objectives for developing 
such projects.91 
                                                                                                                 
 85. See id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. See Stockdale Memorandum, supra note 45, at 12. 
 88. See id. at 7, 12. 
 89. See generally Arthur Maass, Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation’s Rivers 
(1951) (reviewing current policies and practices, describing attempts to establish a uniform national 
water policy, and making specific recommendations). 
 90. Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, § 5, 49 Stat. 1570, 1572 (codified at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 701a–f). It went on to authorize a host of water resources projects, and directed that any projects 
constructed include facilities for future development of hydroelectric power. See id.; Joseph L. Arnold, 
The Evolution of the 1936 Flood Control Act 73, 97 (1988). 
 91. Arnold, supra note 90, at 92–93. The statute has been described as “a good example of 
congressional legislation that is fairly clear in its general goals, but confusing and even irrational in its 
specific policies and administrative machinery.” Id. at iii. 
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The situation as of 1944—just two years before Lake Lanier was 
authorized—is illustrated by the controversy over the development of 
the Missouri River Basin in the 1940s. The Bureau of Reclamation 
and the Army Corps of Engineers developed competing plans for the 
Missouri River Basin—the “Sloan Plan” promoted by the Bureau, 
and the “Pick Plan” promoted by the Corps.92 Ultimately these 
competing plans were reconciled in a document known as the Pick-
Sloan Plan, which was authorized by Congress in the Flood Control 
Act of 1944, at about the same time as Buford Dam.93 
The Bureau and the Corps each criticized the other’s plans. The 
Bureau was especially critical of the Corps’ economic analysis for its 
multipurpose projects—in particular, of its failure to allocate storage 
and to conduct a benefit–cost analysis for each purpose.94 This 
disagreement is demonstrated by correspondence in which the 
Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation urged the Chief of 
Engineers to establish a more precise allocation of storage and costs 
for the Pick Plan.95 The Chief of Engineers declined, explaining that 
the Army preferred instead to request authorization for multiple 
purpose developments in very general terms,96 thus allowing the 
Corps to retain maximum flexibility to alter its projects over time.97 
The Pick-Sloan correspondence demonstrates that Army policy as it 
existed in 1944—just two years before Lake Lanier was authorized—
not only did not require, but actively discouraged the type of detailed 
economic analysis that is required today. 
The modern project authorization procedures were not adopted as 
national policy until 1983, when President Reagan approved the 
Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines for Water 
                                                                                                                 
 92. See generally John R. Ferrell, Big Dam Era 39–68 (1993). 
 93. Pub. L. No. 78-534 § 9, 58 Stat. 887, 891–92 (1944) (codified in scattered sections of 16, 33 & 
43 U.S.C.); Ferrell, supra note 92, at 65. 
 94. See H.R. Doc. No. 78-475, at 5–9 (1944) (printing a letter from H.W. Bashore, Commissioner, 
Bureau of Reclamation, to Major Gen. E. Reybold, Chief of Engineers, War Department); id. at 3 
(printing a letter from Major Gen. E. Reybold, Chief of Engineers, War Department, to Chairman, 
Committee on Flood Control, U.S. House of Representatives). 
 95. See id. at 5–9. 
 96. See id. at 3. 
 97. See id. at 4. 
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and Related Land Resources Implementation Studies (P&G).98 The 
P&G establish detailed guidelines for the survey reports submitted to 
Congress in support of authorization requests. For example, they 
require that the federal objective for any proposed project “be stated 
in terms of an expressed desire to alleviate problems and realize 
opportunities,” and that “[e]ach statement of a problem or 
opportunity should be expressed in terms of a desired output,” such 
as “[r]educ[ing] flood losses in the Red River floodplain . . . .”99 
Given the emphasis on economic efficiency, the P&G further require 
that a detailed benefit–cost analysis be prepared for each project 
purpose to ensure that it is included at the optimal level to maximize 
national economic development.100 When a survey report is prepared 
in accordance with these guidelines, there is rarely any doubt about 
the purposes for which authorization is requested. 
It is precisely this type of analysis the Corps was looking for, but 
did not find, when it reviewed the Chief of Engineers’ report for 
Lake Lanier. The Corps’ logical error was to conclude that the 
absence of a P&G-style analysis for the water supply purpose meant 
that water supply was never intended to be an authorized purpose of 
Lake Lanier—when in fact, as confirmed by the Pick-Sloan 
correspondence, there was simply no expectation at the time that 
such an analysis would be done for each authorized purpose. 
The type of analysis the Corps expected to find in the documents 
for Lake Lanier was not required until December 31, 1952, when the 
Bureau of the Budget issued a directive to all executive agencies 
known as Budget Circular A-47.101 Among other requirements, the 
                                                                                                                 
 98. U.S. Water Res. Council, Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines for Water and 
Related Land Resources Implementation Studies (1983), available at http://planning.usace.army.mil/ 
toolbox/library/Guidance/Principles_Guidelines.pdf. 
 99. Id. at 1. 
 100. Id. at 7. 
 101. Budget Circular A-47 from Frederick J. Lawton, Dir., Bureau of the Budget to the Heads of 
Exec. Dep’ts & Establishments (Dec. 31, 1952) (on file with the Georgia State University Law Review) 
[hereinafter Budget Circular A-47]; see also Maynard M. Hufschmidt, Benefit-Cost Analysis: 1933-
1985, OPEN SIUC 43, available at http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1196&context 
=jcwre (last visited Apr. 15, 2013). The Bureau of the Budget was reorganized into the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) in 1970. Exec. Order No. 11,541, 35 Fed. Reg. 10,737 (July 1, 1970). 
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circular required the following to be included in all survey reports 
requesting authorization: 
A concise but complete estimate of all the benefits and all of the 
economic costs of undertaking the program or project. In 
addition to comparing the total benefits of the program or project 
with its total economic costs, the estimate should also show 
separately the particular benefits and economic costs attributable 
to each purpose of the program or project. Wherever appropriate, 
benefits and economic costs shall be expressed in monetary 
terms. Where monetary estimates cannot reasonably be made, 
the relative significance of such benefits and costs shall be stated 
in as precise and quantitative terms as possible.102 
The Circular further stated: “Inclusion in a multiple-purpose 
program or project plan of any purpose of resource development will, 
except in unusual cases . . . , be considered only if the benefits 
attributable to that particular purpose are greater than the economic 
costs of including that purpose in the program or project.”103 This 
was new because the previous policy established by the Flood 
Control Act of 1936 was merely to ensure that benefits exceeded 
costs overall.104 
Budget Circular A-47 was never fully implemented, and the basic 
planning framework underwent several revisions before the current 
P&G were finally adopted in 1983.105 It is important, though, because 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Budget Circular A-47, supra note 101, at 5–6. 
 103. Id. at 6. 
 104. Pub. L. No. 74-738, § 1, 49 Stat. 1570 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701a–f). 
 105. See generally U.S. Water Res. Council, supra note 98, at 1, 7. For an outline of major changes to 
the planning framework from 1953 to 1983, see Kyna Powers, Cong. Res. Serv., RL31976, Benefit-Cost 
Analysis and the Discount Rate for the Corps of Engineers’ Water Resource Projects: Theory and 
Practice (2003). The latest evolution is the result of Section 2031 of the Water Resources Development 
Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 1962-3, which instructed the Secretary of the Army to revise the 1983 P&G. 
The Secretary released the new “Principles and Requirements” in March 2013, together with proposed 
implementing regulations referred to as the “Interagency Guidelines.” See Council on Envtl. Quality, 
Principles and Requirements for Federal Investments in Water Resources (March 2013), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/final_principles_and_requirements_march_2013.pdf. 
These new Principles and Requirements will not take effect until 180 days after the Interagency 
Guidelines are published in final form. It is unclear when this will occur because the Secretary is 
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it marks the earliest point in time that a Chief of Engineers’ report 
can be expected to have a detailed benefit–cost analysis for each 
proposed project purpose. The lesson from Lake Lanier is that 
extreme caution must be used when interpreting survey reports 
written before 1953—or, more generally, before the existing 
guidelines were adopted. 
IV. A FRESH LOOK AT OLD REPORTS: READING PROJECT DOCUMENTS 
THROUGH AN APPROPRIATE HISTORICAL LENS 
A completely different picture of the Chief of Engineers’ report for 
Lake Lanier emerges when it is read on its own terms, through the 
lens of the policies in effect at the time it was written. At that time, 
all that was required of the benefit–cost analysis was a demonstration 
that overall benefits exceeded overall costs.106 Because the benefit–
cost ratio for Buford Dam was already greater than one, even without 
water supply,107 there was no need to quantify the water supply 
benefit before requesting authorization. In reviewing the 1946 report, 
therefore, the appropriate question to ask is whether it is clear—
notwithstanding the fact that water supply benefits were not 
quantified—that one purpose of the project was to supply water to 
Metropolitan Atlanta. When viewed in this light, it is hard to escape 
the conclusion that providing water to Atlanta was not just a purpose, 
but indeed one of the main reasons that Buford Dam was built. 
The Chief of Engineers’ Report of May 13, 1946108 recommended 
the approval of a plan prepared by the Commander of the South 
Atlantic Division.109 In summarizing this recommendation, the Chief 
of Engineers specifically noted that “the city of Atlanta and local 
                                                                                                                 
currently prohibited from spending any funds to develop or implement the Interagency Guidance. See 
H.R. Rep. No. 112-331, at 802 (2011) (Conf. Rep.). This budget rider was extended under Section 
1101(a)(1) of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act enacted on March 26, 2013. 
See Pub. L. No. 113-6 (Mar. 26, 2013). 
 106. See Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, § 1, 49 Stat. 1570 (codified at 33 U.S.C. 
§ 701a–f). 
 107. See H.R. Doc. No. 80-300, at v–vi (printing letter from L.C. Martin, Assistant Director of 
Estimates, Executive Office of the President, Bureau of the Budget, to the Secretary of War). 
 108. See id. at 1. 
 109. See id. ¶ 16, at 7. 
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interests” urged construction of Buford Dam to meet a “threatened 
shortage of water.”110 He also noted that flow regulation provided by 
the Buford Project would “assure an adequate supply of water for 
municipal and industrial purposes in the Atlanta metropolitan 
area.”111 
General Newman went even further in his own report, which the 
Chief of Engineers approved and submitted to Congress along with 
his own. The Newman Report estimated that Atlanta’s “present 
needs” could be met by providing a minimum continuous flow of 
about 600 cfs, but that “[t]his minimum release may have to be 
increased somewhat as the area develops.”112 General Newman 
expressly recognized that providing additional water to Atlanta for 
water supply would decrease the amount of hydropower the Corps’ 
dams could produce. He concluded, however, that any impacts to 
hydropower resulting from such an increase would be acceptable 
because the change in operations would not “materially reduce” 
power benefits downstream, and also because the benefits of 
providing water supply to Atlanta would “outweigh any slight 
decrease in system power value.”113 When presented this with 
language, the Eleventh Circuit had no difficulty concluding that 
water supply is and always has been an “authorized purpose” of 
Buford Dam.114 
V. THE PROPER ROLE (OR NOT) OF POST-AUTHORIZATION 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND APPROPRIATIONS LEGISLATION IN 
CONSTRUING AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION 
The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that Congress intended for Lake 
Lanier to meet Atlanta’s water supply needs is consistent with the 
Corps’ contemporaneous statements concerning its authorization, as 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id. ¶ 9, at 4. 
 111. Id. ¶ 11(d), at 5 (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. ¶ 80, at 34 (emphasis added). 
 113. H.R. Doc. No. 80-300 ¶ 80, at 34. 
 114. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160, 1187 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012). 
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well as certain more significant later pronouncements of the Corps. 
For example, the Corps issued a “Definite Project Report” shortly 
after authorization of the project, which clearly stated that one of “the 
primary purposes of the Buford project” was “an increased water 
supply for Atlanta.”115 Even the bronze memorial tablet on the face 
of Buford Dam identifies water supply as one of the “primary 
purposes” of the project.116 More recently, the Corps produced a 
report to Congress stating that water supply is an authorized purpose 
under the River and Harbor Act of 1946,117 and this finding is 
codified in the Corps’ regulations.118 
However, none of these subsequent pronouncements factored into 
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision. Rather, the Eleventh Circuit based its 
conclusion that water supply is an authorized purpose of Lake Lanier 
on the authorizing legislation and the incorporated project documents 
alone.119 This is as it should be. The scope of Congress’s 
authorization was fixed by the authorizing legislation itself. Later 
statements by the Corps or even subsequent Congresses, absent 
express repeal or alteration, cannot change what was authorized in 
the River and Harbor Act of 1946, and they offer little if any 
guidance into the authorizing Congress’s intent.120 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. at 1169 (citing U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs: Mobile District, Definite Project Report on 
Buford Dam Chattahoochee River, Georgia ¶ 48 (1949)). 
 116. Photograph of Memorial Tablet, Buford Dam (“FOR PURPOSES OF FLOOD CONTROL—
NAVIGATION—POWER—RECREATION AND WATER SUPPLY.”) (on file with the Georgia State 
University Law Review). 
 117. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, supra note 17, at E-94. This report was submitted to Congress in 
response to a congressional mandate in the Water Resources Development Act of 1990, which required 
the Corps to identify the authorized purposes for each of its projects. See id. at 1. 
 118. See 33 C.F.R. § 222.5 app. E (2013) (identifying “Municipal and/or Industrial Water/Supply” as 
an authorized purpose of Buford Dam and Lake Lanier). 
 119. See In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d at 1186–92. 
 120. See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 
170 (2001) (“[S]ubsequent history is less illuminating than the contemporaneous evidence . . . .” 
(quoting Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 420 (1994))); Blanchette v. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 
102, 132 (1974) (“But post-passage remarks of legislators, however explicit, cannot serve to change the 
legislative intent of Congress expressed before the Act’s passage. Such statements ‘represent only the 
personal views of these legislators, since the statements were (made) after passage of the act.’” (citations 
omitted)); Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 639 n.34 (1967) (“[T]hese statements 
could represent only the personal views of these legislators, since the statements were inserted in the 
Congressional Record after passage of the Act.”); United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 
U.S. 258, 282 (1947) (“We fail to see how the remarks of these Senators in 1943 can serve to change the 
legislative intent of Congress expressed in 1932.”). 
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Yet water projects like Lake Lanier and other Corps multipurpose 
reservoirs—particularly those authorized during this time period—
are notable in at least two respects. First, they are often massive 
developments that are studied, authorized, funded, and constructed 
over a long period of time.121 Congressional involvement therefore 
extends far beyond the original authorization of a project, and the 
Corps is required to return to Congress annually in an effort to secure 
funds for the construction of previously authorized projects.122 
Second, perhaps as a result of the pervasive congressional 
involvement and their potential to confer significant benefits on 
particular uses or users, water projects are frequently driven by the 
special, and often parochial, interests of particular members of 
Congress.123 
Together, these two characteristics often lead to efforts by later 
Congresses (or more frequently, by specific congresspersons) to 
somehow alter the function of an authorized project in a way that 
suits their particular interests. Indeed, the Corps is given 
extraordinarily broad latitude to develop water projects, which 
affords the Corps substantial discretion in the specific design and 
operation of its multipurpose reservoirs.124 The members of Congress 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Lake Lanier, for example, was the culmination of decades of work. The survey report 
incorporated into the River and Harbor Act of 1946 was authorized twenty-one years earlier by the 
River and Harbor Act of 1925. See H.R. Doc. No. 80-300, at 10. Following its authorization in 1946, it 
took ten years of appropriations by Congress and construction work by the Corps before the project was 
ultimately completed in 1956. 
 122. See Maass, supra note 89, at 34 (explaining that funds for navigation and flood control projects 
are appropriated annually, and that the “appropriation process is involved in all stages of project 
planning[,] [m]oney is appropriated for conducting the preliminary examination, survey, definite project 
report, and detailed plans and specifications”). 
 123. Arthur Maass explains that, as of 1934, the Corps: 
was more nearly responsible to individual Members of Congress directly than to 
Congress as a whole or to certain congressional committees. Senators and 
Representatives, knowing that the projects they sponsored could not as a rule be 
undertaken without favorable Engineer survey reports and support from the [Corps] for 
congressional authorizations and appropriations, attempted to pressure the executive 
agency into approving those projects. 
Id. at 63. He goes on to explain that the “history of the development of procedures for planning water 
resource projects between 1934 and 1949 is largely the history of attempts to break down this pattern of 
direct [Corps] responsibility to the legislature.” Id. at 68. 
 124. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (explaining that the 
Flood Control Act of 1944, which authorized the Corps’ projects on the Missouri River, grants the 
Corps broad discretion to balance among the projects’ various authorized purposes and “does not 
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who oversee the authorization and appropriate funds for these 
projects are aware of this discretion and the Corps’ need to return for 
additional funding to see its projects through to completion. As a 
result, they and others in Congress often seek to use the 
appropriations process to shape the design and function of projects, 
exacting agreements and concessions from the Corps before an 
appropriation is made. While these agreements are rarely included as 
actual conditions of appropriations legislation, both the Corps and the 
appropriators (who have long memories) take them seriously. 
Both of these issues are clearly evident in the post-authorization 
history of Lake Lanier. As discussed above, budget priorities and 
cost–benefit requirements changed over time. These shifting 
priorities and policies led the Corps and members of Congress 
seeking to secure funding for Lake Lanier to change the way they 
described the project in testimony before the appropriations 
committees. The focus shifted away from water supply to those 
purposes that, at that time, would support an appropriation based on 
then-existing budget policy and cost–benefit requirements.125 What is 
more, the project, like many others, became part of a larger struggle 
regarding the proper role of the federal government in shaping water 
policy, federal budget priorities, and the relative role of states and 
local governments in constructing and funding water projects for 
their benefit. Thus it was that Congressman Gerald Ford, a fiscally 
conservative proponent of a more limited federal role and increased 
cost-sharing by the beneficiaries of federal projects, focused on the 
absence of any monetary contribution by Atlanta toward the project, 
and sought concessions from the Corps in an apparent effort to limit 
the federal benefit conferred on Atlanta.126 
                                                                                                                 
provide is a method of deciding whether the balance actually struck by the Corps in a given case is 
correct or not”). 
 125. See, e.g., Civil Functions, Department of the Army Appropriations, 1954: Hearings on H.R. 5376 
Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 83d Cong. 480 (1953) (statement of Colonel 
E.C. Paules) (describing the project as “a combination flood control—power project which will assist 
navigation downstream by the regulation of the river flows”); Civil Functions, Department of the Army 
Appropriations, 1953: Hearings on H.R. 7268 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 
82d Cong. 1196–97 (1952) (statement of Rep. James C. Davis, Georgia) (seeking appropriations and 
describing the project as providing flood control, power, and navigation benefits). 
 126. See Civil Functions, epartment [sic] of the Army Appropriations for 1952: Hearings Before the 
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The district court in the Tri-State case relied heavily on this “post-
authorization legislative history,” focusing almost exclusively on 
statements and reports generated long after the project was 
authorized in 1946 to conclude that water supply was not an 
authorized purpose.127 For example, the district court found that the 
“legislative history of the Buford project . . . consistently described 
the primary purposes of the project as flood control, navigation, and 
hydropower.”128 But to reach this conclusion, the district court relied 
exclusively on statements made in appropriations hearings in 1951, 
1953, and 1954, respectively, well after the project was authorized.129 
Reliance on post-authorization statements from appropriations 
hearings to ascertain the scope of a project’s authorization is 
seriously misplaced. First, as discussed above, “subsequent 
legislative history is” at best “a hazardous basis for inferring the 
intent of an earlier Congress.”130 This becomes particularly true the 
farther removed the statements are from the authorization itself.131 
Second, because the appropriations process is separate from the 
authorization process, appropriations usually do not affect 
substantive project authorizations. Indeed, the rules of both the 
House and the Senate specifically prohibit the inclusion in an 
appropriations bill of any amendment to existing law. These rules 
“call[] for previous choice of policy through authorization by law 
before any item of appropriations might be included in a general 
appropriations bill.”132 As the Supreme Court explained in TVA v. 
                                                                                                                 
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 82d Cong. 118, 121–22 (1951) (statement of Colonel 
Potter). 
 127. See In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1345 (M.D. Fla. 2009), rev’d and 
vacated sub nom. In re MDL-1824 Tri-State Water Rights Litig., 644 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2011) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 25 (2012). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 131. See Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 611 F.2d 1074, 1082 (5th Cir. 1980) (explaining, in a case 
involving a committee report issued five years after the relevant legislation, that later statements are of 
little if any interpretive value when they are “so distant in time from the enacting Congress that we 
cannot accept their remarks as an accurate expression of the earlier Congress’s intent”). 
 132. See United States ex rel. Chapman v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 345 U.S. 153, 164 n.5 (1953) (citing 
S. Doc. No. 239, at 20 (Rule XVI of Senate Manual, 77th Cong.); H.R. Doc. No. 812, at 384 (Rule XXI 
of Rules of the House of Representatives, 77th Cong.)). 
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Hill, the purpose of this rule is to avoid the situation where “every 
appropriations measure would be pregnant with prospects of altering 
substantive legislation, repealing by implication any prior statute 
which might prohibit the expenditure.”133 This is not to say that 
Congress absolutely cannot use appropriations legislation as a vehicle 
to change the substantive law, as it has been established that it can,134 
but the rule does create a strong presumption against finding that this 
has occurred. More generally, it is quite clear that a substantive 
authorization cannot, under any circumstances, be modified as a 
result of congressional testimony or language included in a 
committee report that is not enacted into law. 
In the end, as in all cases of statutory interpretation, the question is 
Congress’s intent. That intent must be gleaned from the authorizing 
legislation and any incorporated reports, read in their historical 
context. The focus must be on what Congress understood it was 
authorizing, and special care must be taken to avoid being drawn in 
by shifting project descriptions and convenient appropriations 
testimony occurring long after authorization. 
CONCLUSION 
The operations of many existing federal water projects need to be 
updated to address present and future needs. This need will only 
increase as communities grapple with balancing population and 
economic growth and environmental health with dwindling water 
supplies. To date, however, this has proved difficult and all too often 
led to seemingly endless litigation among basin stakeholders. 
                                                                                                                 
 133. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978). 
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 222 (1980) (“Nevertheless, when Congress desires 
to suspend or repeal a statute in force, ‘[t]here can be no doubt that . . . it could accomplish its purpose 
by an amendment to an appropriation bill, or otherwise.’” (quoting United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 
554, 555 (1940))); id. (“‘The whole question depends on the intention of Congress as expressed in the 
statutes.’” (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 109 U.S. 146, 150 (1883))); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians 
of Fla. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 619 F.3d 1289, 1303 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that provision in 
omnibus appropriations act repealed National Environmental Policy Act, Endangered Species Act, and 
other statutes as they related to Everglades restoration project, and thus deprived federal courts of 
jurisdiction to hear tribe’s claims). 
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The Tri-State Water Rights Litigation makes clear that the Corps 
may be able to modify project operations to meet the needs of the 
twenty-first century without additional Congressional authorization. 
It teaches us that to fully understand the scope of the Corps’ authority 
at a particular project, we must read and understand the authorizing 
legislation and survey reports through a historical lens that accounts 
for the policies and procedures in place at the time the project was 
authorized. And it cautions against the dangers of relying on post-
authorization statements to ascertain a project’s authorized purposes. 
In the end, the Tri-State Litigation shows that the Corps has much 
more authority than it has previously understood or has been willing 
to accept. This expansive authority perhaps puts the Army in an 
unenviable position, as it will be forced to make incredibly 
controversial and consequential decisions. But this is just the natural 
consequence of Congress’s broad delegation of authority to the 
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